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Abstract: This paper discusses the occupation of Serbia during the First World War by 
Austro-Hungarian forces. The first partial occupation was short-lived as the Serbian 
army repelled the aggressors after the Battle of Kolubara in late 1914, but the second 
one lasted from fall 1915 until the end of the Great War. The Austro-Hungarian 
occupation zone in Serbia covered the largest share of Serbia’s territory and it was 
organised in the shape of the Military Governorate on the pattern of Austro-Hun-
garian occupation of part of Poland. The invaders did not reach a clear decision as to 
what to do with Serbian territory in post-war period and that gave rise to consider-
able frictions between Austro-Hungarian and German interests in the Balkans, then 
between Austrian and Hungarian interests and, finally, between military and civilian 
authorities within Military Governorate. Throughout the occupation Serbia was ex-
posed to ruthless economic exploitation and her population suffered much both from 
devastation and from large-scale repression (including deportations, internments and 
denationalisation) on the part of the occupation regime. 
Keywords: Serbia, Austria-Hungary, occupation of Serbia 1915–1918, Military Gov-
ernorate, Great War
The Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia in 1914 was perhaps the most convincing confirmation of the truism that war is but a continuation of 
peacetime politics by extraordinary means. The declaration of war on Serbia 
was an attempt to resolve the precarious internal, national and social issues 
of the Habsburg Empire by violence. However, these issues would remain 
open during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbia in the First World 
War.
The Austro-Serbian conflict in 1914 was an expression of deep-root-
ed contradictions in the recent historical development of the Balkans and 
Central Europe. The Balkan states of the nineteenth century were born in 
national and agrarian revolutions resulting from the application of the na-
tionality principle which was increasingly predominant in modern Europe. 
By contrast, the Habsburg Empire was founded on the principle of histori-
cal legitimism and it of necessity had to come into conflict, sooner or later, 
with the developments on its own soil and in the Balkans. The formation of 
Serbia and Montenegro in the nineteenth century turned into an external 
and internal threat to Habsburg legitimism: externally, because it hindered 
aggressive tendencies towards the south; internally, because it benefited the 
process of emancipation of the peoples under the Habsburg crown. There-
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fore, Serbia and Montenegro were not such a danger for the vast thousand-
year-long Central European Empire in themselves, but rather as part of that 
broad and general movement for social and economic emancipation of the 
nations in Central and South-Eastern Europe. This was all the more so as 
the aggressive tendencies of the Habsburg Empire themselves foundered on 
the dilemma between demands for quelling these movements and impos-
sibility to do so. Unresolved nationality issues within the Empire prevented 
the accretion of additional Slav population which, in turn, did not allow for 
a radical solution of the Balkan question. On the other hand, at the stage of 
European imperialism reached at the turn of the century the Balkan ques-
tion was increasingly becoming part of European high politics. Blocked from 
within by resistance of the ruling circles of “historic nations” to the trialist 
solution for the internal structure of the Empire, suppressed from outside 
by rivalry on the part of Russia and western democracies opposed to Ger-
man Drang, Austria-Hungary was forced to conduct status quo policy in the 
Balkans which manifested itself in stifling local development, suppressing 
Russia and attempting economic penetration in competition with stronger 
opponents. Such static and basically negative policy was bound to come into 
conflict with dynamical development of the new national states in South-
Eastern Europe. The consequence of such policy was an attempt to resolve 
not just the Serbian but also the Yugoslav and Balkan question by violence, 
by declaring war in 1914. In the conditions of international tension and 
struggle for redistribution of world power, the Austro-Hungarian attack on 
Serbia was as good excuse as any for the outbreak of the First World War.1
This short introduction is necessary for understanding Austria-Hun-
gary’s occupation policy in Serbia in 1915–18 because it reflected the same 
unresolved difficulties which had burdened the Habsburg Empire in the 
pre-war period. The war and the occupation of Serbia perhaps just high-
lighted those difficulties more clearly.  
I
Entering into war against Serbia in 1914 Austria-Hungary had only one 
clearly defined goal – military annihilation of Serbia. There was an utter 
confusion as to what policy should be pursued further and what the Em-
pire’s permanent objectives in Serbia were. There were three different con-
ceptions regarding the future of Serbia. The military, in particular the Chief 
of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, advocated a long-lasting 
military occupation of Serbia with pronounced annexationist ambitions and 
1 D. Djordjević, “The Serbs as an integrating and disintegrating factor”, Austrian History 
Yearbook 3/2 (Houston 1967), 48–82. See more in D. Djordjević, Révolutions nationales 
des peuples balkaniques, 1804–1914. Belgrade: Institut d’histoire, 1965.
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intention to permanently secure the possession of the strategically impor-
tant Morava-Vardar valley and eliminate any potential influence of Serbia 
on her co-nationals in the Monarchy. The Hungarian ruling circles headed 
by Prime Minister, István Tisza, set their faces against it refusing to have the 
Slav population of Austria-Hungary increased and seeing it as a threat of 
trialism. Rejecting the annexation of the entire country, Budapest envisaged 
annexing a smaller part of north-western Serbia to Hungary (the so-called 
bridgehead at Šabac and Belgrade). The Foreign Ministry in Vienna was in 
favour of a free hand policy towards Serbia refusing to prejudge her ultimate 
fate given the uncertain outcome of the war and peace negotiations and not 
excluding the existence of a rump weakened Serbia closely attached to the 
Empire through economic and political agreements. 
Divergence of views and interests in relation to the future position 
of Serbia came to the fore and found its expression in the conclusions of 
the joint Ministerial Council’s sessions held on 19 July 1914 and 7 Janu-
ary 1916. They contained the following provisions: 1) Serbia would not be 
annexed to the Monarchy; 2) a prospective peace settlement could provide 
for a rump independent Serbia; 3) the territories to be annexed in the south 
Austro-Hungarian occupation zones
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would be annexed to Hungary, but their position would be determined by 
the legislative bodies of both constituent parts of the Monarchy.2 Lack of 
clarity and incompleteness of these provisions, and especially the contra-
diction of interests from which they emerged caused considerable friction 
within the occupation authority and influenced, to a large degree, direction 
and extent of its operation. 
II
The organisation of administration over certain occupied regions of Serbia 
was carried out in November 1914 when the Serbian Army was retreat-
ing to Mt Suvobor in preparation for the decisive Battle of the Kolubara. 
The entry into abandoned Belgrade on 2 December was declared a great 
victory by the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command.3 Penetrating into 
the interior of Serbia, however, the invader found desolate land because 
population was retreating along with the army which made it difficult to 
establish new authorities.4 The conquered area was divided into five county 
commands (Etappenbezirkskommando) headed by Military Governorate in 
Belgrade. Field-Marshall Stjepan Sarkotić was appointed Governor by im-
perial decree. Administrative staff was supposed to be recruited from civil 
servants from Austria, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina.5 But they did 
not have enough time to make it to Serbia and take up their duties because 
the Serbian army’s counteroffensive at the Kolubara River resulted in the 
liberation of the whole country on 15 December. 6
2 N. Petrović, “Zajednički austro-ugarski kabinet i Jugoslovensko pitanje 1912–1918”, 
in Jugoslovenski narodi pred prvi svatski rat, Department of Social Sciences series vol. 61 
(Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1967), 733–739. 
3 D. Milikić, “Beograd pod okupacijom u prvom svetskom ratu”, Godišnjak grada Beogra-
da V (1958), 263; see also Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (HHSTAW) Polit. Ar-
chiv Liasse Krieg 2a (1914–1916), Telegramm von Masirevich, Koviljača 2. XII. 1914.
4 HHSTAW, P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, Masirevich an den k. u k. Minister des Aeus-
sern Grafen Berchtold, Koviljača 26. XI. 1914 – “Part of the country from the Drina 
to Valjevo,” Masirević wrote, “is completely deserted and without population.” County 
commands were located in Loznica, Šabac, Valjevo, Užice and Belgrade.  
5 HHSTAW, P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Telegrammes des Feldzeugmei-
sters Potiorek vom 25. November 1914 an den Herrn k. u k. Ministerpräsidenten; ibid. 
Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern in der Nachrichten Abteilung des 
Operationsoberkommando B Gruppe, Koviljača 6. XII. 1914; ibid. Militär Kanzlei Sr. 
Majestät No 3637, 24. XI. 1914.
6 D. Djordjevic, “Vojvoda Putnik. The Serbian High Command and Strategy in 1914”, 
in Béla K. Király & Nandor Dreisziger, eds., East Central European Society in the First 
World War, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985, 569–589.
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The second occupation of Serbia lasted much longer – from fall 1915 to 
fall 1918. The Austro-Hungarian occupation area stretched up to the Morava 
River (from Smederevo to Stalać) and the line descending on Mt Jastrebac 
and, partly, Mt Kopaonik to the south-east of Kosovska Mitrovica and above 
Prizren to the Albanian border. Regions in the east and south including Ser-
bian Macedonia were ceded to Bulgaria. The establishing of occupation zones 
in Serbia, Montenegro and Albania was informed by the frontiers established 
in Bucharest in 1913.7 The new administration was gradually formed in step 
with development of military operations through the so-called Ettapen system 
of county commands. Finally, the Military General Governorate for Serbia 
was formed on 1 January 1916 on the model of Austro-Hungarian occupa-
tion of the Russian part of Poland.8 It was under jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Command and headed by General-Governor with the rank of a corps com-
mander appointed by the Emperor. A civilian commissary and chief of staff 
were added as auxiliary organs. Under General-Governor in Belgrade were 
the Command of the City of Belgrade, county commands and municipalities. 
The prior Serbian administrative division into counties was maintained for 
the sake of efficiency with certain modifications in the counties bordering on 
the territory ceded to Bulgaria.9 The Governorate encompassed four admin-
istrative departments: military, political, economic and judicial. The military 
one was under the command of the chief of staff and consisted of presidial, 
transportation, gendarmerie and supply sections; the political department 
headed by a staff officer had its intelligence and political-police sections (with 
offices for educational, cultural, police and medical matters); the economic 
department had economic and financial sections: the former had offices for 
trade, agriculture, forestry, mining and military production plants; the latter 
had offices for direct and indirect taxes. Finally, the judicial department had 
sections for criminal and civil law matters. County commands had executive 
and judicial authority in their respective counties. At the bottom of this ladder 
were municipalities with their mayors, elected from the ranks of reliable local 
people, and municipal court.10 
7 HHSTAW,  P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Evidenzbureau des k. u k. Generalstabes, Haup-
tmann Julius Ledineg an das k. u k. Armeeoberkommando.
8 Ibid. Armeeoberkommando, General-Oberst Conrad an den Militär Generalgouver-
neur im Belgrad 1. I. 1916. A similar General Military Governorate was also established 
in Montenegro. See V. N. Rakočević, “Crna Gora pod austrougarskom okupacijom 
1916–1918” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, p. 355ff ). 
9 Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern an den Minister des Äussern 
Baron Burián, Belgrad den 5. November 1915.
10 Ibid. P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, B. Behörden – Organisation und allgemeine Grundsät-
ze für Ihren Wirkungskreis. Besides the Command of the City of Belgrade, there were 
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In such organisation of the occupation administration the army 
played a dominant role which was understandable in view of wartime cir-
cumstances. But because of the conflict of interests and aspirations in the 
conquered area frictions soon emerged in interpretation of the basic aims 
and tasks of the occupation. Those frictions came to pass first between 
Austro-Hungarian and German interests in the Balkans, then between 
Austrian and Hungarian interests and, finally, between military and civilian 
authorities.
III
Military operations carried out from 1914 onwards demonstrated Austria-
Hungary’s increasing dependence on its German ally. This caused among 
the ruling circles of the Habsburg Empire not just a sense of dwindling 
prestige, but also a fear that Germany would impose solutions which ex-
clusively suited her own interests. On two occasions such fear was not un-
founded: during German attempts to conclude a separate peace with Serbia 
and thus shake off the burden of the Balkan front and during German eco-
nomic exploitation of the conquered Serbian land. 
1) The failure of a rapid war operation on the Western front, the need 
to engage ever increasing number of troops against Russia and the siding of 
Italy with the Entente Powers made the Central Powers in May 1915 con-
sider the possibility of a separate peace on the less important Serbian battle-
field. The German plan was quite a large-scale one: to regroup the Balkan 
forces and form another Balkan alliance under the aegis of Germany for the 
purpose of pressurising Romania, relieving the forces on the Italian front 
and blocking the Entente’s Balkan plans. These objectives could be achieved 
through a separate peace with Serbia which would obtain an outlet to the 
sea across northern Albania, unify with Montenegro and establish close 
ties with the Monarchy. Serbia would, in return, cede Serbian Macedonia 
to Bulgaria while Greece would receive southern Albania.11 Doubting that 
it was possible to settle scores both with Italy and Serbia at the same time 
Viennese diplomacy was inclined to such solution as it believed that the 
Monarchy’s prestige would not suffer following the success of the Central 
Powers on the Eastern front and preferring the entrenchment in Albania 
of a small Serbia to that of Italy.12 Although in agreement with those com-
12 counties: Belgrade, Kragujevac, Gornji Milanovac, Novi Pazar, Šabac, Užice, Čačak, 
Kruševac, Mitrovica, Prijepolje, Smederevo, Valjevo. 
11 Ibid. P. A., K. 952, Krieg 25g, Auszug aus Aufzeichnung über die 24. V. 1915. erfolgte 
Unterredung in Pless; Ibid. Gesanschaft in Stockholm, Bericht n0 43 A-C/P, 18. VI. 1915.
12 Ibid. Krieg 25g, Promemoria des Grafen Hoyos über die Möglichkeit eines Separat-
friedens mit Serbien 22. Mai 1915.
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binations Vienna was rather suspicious of German feelers cast through the 
intermediary of the Greek king and, even more so, German agents in the 
Balkans.13 In fall 1915, on the eve of the offensive against Serbia, Vienna 
and Budapest opposed the renewed German attempts to pre-empt military 
operation with negotiations. The Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza accused 
Germany of “intriguing” in Serbia behind the back of Austria-Hungary.14 
Prince Hohenlohe openly requested from the German Foreign Minister, 
Gottlieb von Jagow, in Berlin that “German agents in the Balkans stop with 
this practice”.15 On the contrary, German diplomacy was dismayed by the 
lack of Austria-Hungary’s concrete plans for Serbia. When von Jagow in-
structed his Ambassador Tschirschky to sound out Vienna’s stance if Serbia 
in the last moment, facing annihilation, sought for a peaceful solution, the 
Foreign Minister, Count Burián, simply replied that he was against half-
measures that would harm the Monarchy’s prestige.16 Vienna wanted an of-
fensive, destruction of Serbia and occupation of her entire territory.17 After 
another German insistence, in October 1915, Vienna again evaded giving 
a specific reply.18 That was hardly surprising as Vienna did not have a clear 
idea as to her Balkan intentions. In early November, when General Falken-
heyn urgently asked for conditions to be put forward before expected Ser-
bian parliamentarians, von Jagow reproached Prince Hohenlohe stressing 
that “we must be clear in our mind as to what we want”. The only answer he 
received was a repetition of general request for “complete military capitu-
lation of Serbia”.19 Informing Prince Hohenlohe in November 1915 that 
the fate of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania would be discussed at a forth-
13 Ibid. Telegramm Silaschi, Athenes 28. September 1915; Hohenlohe an Burián, Berlin 
3. VIII. 1915; Ibid. 6. X. 1915; Burián an Czernin und Tarnowski, Wien 16. VIII. 1915.
14 Ibid. Krieg b-I, Tisza an Burián 2. X. 1915. Tisza threatened that German attempts to 
negotiate behind the back and on behalf of Austria-Hungary militate against the Mon-
archy’s favourable attitude towards Serbia. He requested that the two allied countries 
determine their objectives in the Balkans.  
15 Ibid.. P. A. I., Krieg 25g, K. 952, Note des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern an Graf 
Tisza in Budapest.
16 Chiffre-Telegramm ddto Berlin 27 September 1915, Prinz Hohenlohe an das k. u 
k. Ministerium des Äussern (Streng geheim). Hohenlohe was sceptical about ‘prestige’ 
since the subjugation of Serbia could only be carried out with Germany’s intervention. 
17 Ibid. Telegramm in Ziffern des Ministers des Äussern Baron Burián an Prinzen Ho-
henlohe in Berlin, ddto Wien 28. September 1915, Geheim.
18 Ibid. Telegramm in Ziffern an Gottfried Prinzen Hohenlohe in Berlin, ddto Wien 
30. Oktober 1915, Geheim! Ibid. Chiffre Telegramm des Prinzen Hohenlohe ddto Ber-
lin 31. Oktober 1915.
19 Ibid. Prinz Hohenlohe an Minister Baron Burián, Geheim – Berlin 3. November 1915.
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coming meeting in Berlin, Burián limited his instructions to opposition 
to unification of these countries and demand for continuation of military 
operations.20 Fearing that Germany might act on her own, the Ministry in 
Vienna demanded to have a representative in Field-Marshal August von 
Mackensen’s army with the view to taking part in the acceptance of Serbian 
capitulation.21 However, contrary to expectations of the Central Powers, the 
Serbian government and Supreme Command did not offer capitulation but 
rather proceeded to retreat across Albania. The eagerly expected Serbian 
parliamentarians did not turn up at all.22
2) The conquest of Serbia posed other problems before the Austro-
German allies, particularly in the matters of administration, division of war 
spoils and economic exploitation of the occupied area. The Hungarian Prime 
Minister Tisza was the first one to be alarmed having heard that German 
military administration would be introduced in Serbia. On 7 November 1915, 
he vehemently protested in the Supreme Command requesting from Conrad 
von Hötzendorf to explain to the Germans that Serbia was in the Hungarian 
sphere of interest.23 In a conversation held on 8 November with Conrad von 
Hötzendorf in Pless, General Falkenheyn accepted an Austro-Hungarian oc-
cupation administration in Serbia, but he refused to commit himself in writ-
ten on 12 November using the on-going military operations as an excuse.24 
Besides, Germany did not intend to dispute Austria-Hungary’s right to Ser-
bia; she just wanted to buy some time in order to extract as much loot as pos-
sible and secure economic advantages in the occupation regime. Burián was, 
however, very suspicious; he insisted in Berlin on 18 November that, given its 
“immediate interests and contiguous position” Serbia belonged to the Mon-
archy which would introduce its own administration there in accordance with 
Falkenheyn’s statement of 8 November.25 Austro-Hungarian reports from 
this period were rife with bitter accusations on account of German ruthless 
exploitation of Poland and Serbia. According to those reports, the Germans 
had devastated forests, taken all food, coal, petroleum, introduced unrealistic 
exchange rate for ruble, damaged industry and deprived it of raw materials, 
transported field workers to Germany and imposed high railway and custom 
20 Ibid. Notiz: I. Herrn von Tschirschky; II. Prinz Hohenlohe, Burián Wien 5. XI. 1915.
21 Ibid. Baron Mussulin an Graven Thurn, Armeeoberkommando, Wien 28. X. 1915.
22 News of two Serbian parliamentarians coming to negotiate on 11 November caused 
a great stir, but it turned out to be false.  
23 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 23a, Abschrift – Note an Grafen Thurn, Wien 7. XI. 1915.
24 Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Aeussern beim k. u k. Armeeober-
kommando, Teschen 15. November 1915 (Wiesner an Burián).
25 Ibid. Abschrift eines streng vertraulichen Erlasses an Prinzen Gottfried Hohenlohe, 
Wien 18. November 1915; Ibid. Telegramm Hohenlohe, Berlin 21. XI. 1915.
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tariffs as well as tax rates. The Germans behaved the same way in Serbia and 
appropriated all resources, commandeered all wheat, flour, wine, cattle, salt, 
petroleum etc. The reports predicted that famine and permanent impoverish-
ment of the population would reach such level that it would not just threaten 
the current situation but also cause infinite consequences in the future.26 It 
would be Austria-Hungary that would suffer worst because of that as she 
counted on this area in post-war period. The reports of Austro-Hungarian 
occupation authorities reflected struggle between the allies over the loot in 
Serbia. To bring that conflict to an end Conrad von Hötzendorf stated to 
General Falkenheyn on 20 December 1915 that the Austro-Hungarian mili-
tary administration in Serbia was an accomplished fact warning the German 
Command at the same time to moderate requisitions of Serbian supplies.27 
The German Command was prepared to cede Serbia to Austria-Hungary if 
the latter fulfilled certain conditions: 1) free and uninterrupted German tran-
sit for civilian and military purposes; 2) opening of the Serbian economic area 
to Germany for the purpose of supplying with foodstuff and raw materials; 3) 
equality of customs conditions in case a separate customs zone was created in 
Serbia; 4) the Smederevo-Niš-Skoplje railway and Kragujevac and its railway 
network remained in German hands; 5) German right to exploit copper in 
the mine of Bor.28 The request for economic exploitation, particularly that of 
mines and railway, was a major concern for Vienna.29 Ballhausplatz accused 
the Germans of deliberate procrastination with their temporary military ad-
ministration in Serbia with the view to keeping railways and mines in their 
possession for as long as possible.30 In order to back their mining requests, the 
Austrians invoked the pre-war rights of their StEG company (Österreichisch-
ungarische Staatseisenbahngesellschaft)31 and fought tooth and nail in the Su-
26 Ibid. On the economic exploitation of “Russian” Poland in Serbia on the part of the 
German army – a copy of a strictly confidential report to Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe, 
Wien 27. XII. 1915.
27 Ibid. General Oberst Conrad an den Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres Herrn 
Erich von Falkenheyn, Standort des AOK, 20. XII 1915.
28 Ibid. Notiz auf die Notizen vom 21. November, 24. November, 1. December und 
12. December d. J. – Berlin 28. XII. 1915. The civilian and military views in Germany 
diverged. Civilians wanted Bor for Germany and were willing to cede Majdanpek to 
Austria-Hungary and Plakatnica to Bulgaria. The military insisted on maintaining con-
trol over Majdanpek mine. Germany granted to Austria-Hungary a third of copper 
from mine of Bor. 
29 Ibid. Thurn an den Minister des Äussern Baron Burián, Teschen 10. Jänner 1916.
30 Ibid. Baron Burián an Grafen Thurn – Telegramm, Wien 11. XII. 1915.
31 StEG had signed contracts with the Serbian government in 1912 for exploration of 
the mining basin of Krajina in eastern Serbia, with the Belgian Company for explora-
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preme Command to secure exploitation of Majdanpek mine for themselves.32 
As for the railways, an agreement was reached in January 1916 which left the 
railway from Smederevo to the Greek border in German hands as long as 
German troops were engaged on the Balkan front.
The Bulgarian ally was not fully trusted either. Although the For-
eign Ministry in Vienna did not oppose forced Bulgarisation of eastern and 
southern Serbia in principle, and even condoned it,33 a number of docu-
ments in the Vienna archives point out the great extent to and suspicion 
with which Bulgarian propaganda in the provinces of Kosovo, Metohija and 
Serbian Macedonia populated by Albanians was followed.34  
IV
Just as the Hungarians feared in 1915 that Germany might present them 
with an accomplished fact, the Austrians suspected Hungarians of do-
ing the same. Alarm was caused by Korrespondenzbureau on 10 November 
1914, confirmed by the Magyarorszag nine days later, that the authori-
ties in the occupied region of Mačva were of Hungarian character with a 
Hungarian commander, gendarmerie and clerks.35 On 19 November, the 
Austrian Prime Minister, Baron Stürgkh, filed an energetic protest with 
the Foreign Ministry, the Budapest government and the southern front 
command describing such action as “a flagrant infringement on Austria’s 
rights” and warning that he would “deny his consent to any solution which 
would not be unequivocal about the fact that the conquered land was ad-
ministered on behalf of the Monarchy through its plenipotentiaries and 
delegates”.36 Facing resistance Tisza tried in early December to achieve his 
goal in a roundabout way. Complaining about bulkiness and inefficiency of 
the administrative apparatus consisting of clerks from Austria, Hungary, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina he suggested to Count Berchtold some sort of 
internal division of spheres of interest: Hungarian clerks in Serbia, Aus-
tion of Majdanpek as well as with the Majdanpek company. See ibid. The exploitation 
of mines in Serbia.
32 Ibid. Von Falkenheyn an Gen. Oberst Conrad, Teschen 28. XII 1915; Der Vertreter 
des Ministeriums des Äussern beim Armeeoberkommando Wiesner an Baron Burián, 
Teschen 29. XII 1915,
33 Ibid. K. 975, Krieg 32, Vize-Consul in Nisch an Grafen Czernin, 20. III. 1918.
34 Ibid. K. 975, Krieg 32-i.
35 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Telegramm des Korrespondenzbureau 10. XI. 1914.
36 Ibid. Note des k. u k. Ministerpräsidenten Baron Stürgkh an den Minister des Äus-
sern Grafen Berchtold, Wien 19. November 1914. Berchtold instantly admonished the 
commander of the southern front, General Potiorek – Note des Ministers des Äussern 
an den Ministerpräsidenten in Wien, Str. Vertraulich, Wien 20. November 1914. 
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trian in the so-called “Russian” Poland.37 The proposal was rejected in Vi-
enna.38 In winter 1915/16, conflict broke out between military and civilian 
authorities in General Military Governorate in Serbia. The reasons for this 
conflict were twofold. First, Austro-Hungarian rivalry; then, annexationist 
plans of the military command in Serbia – all resulting from the divergence 
of views in respect of general policy towards Serbia i.e. the aims and tasks 
of occupation. Imposing an occupation regime, the Supreme Command 
unequivocally started introducing a regime of long-lasting military ad-
ministration with annexationist objectives. The Hungarian government set 
their faces against it as it preferred – and it was backed by the joint Foreign 
Ministry – to keep the Serbian question open until the end of the war. That 
is how that dispute turned into the conflict between military and civilian 
authorities over the jurisdiction of civilians within military administration, 
educational policy in the Governorate and, in general, the regime in the 
occupied area.
Above all, soldiers took a dim view of civilian interference with what 
they considered exclusively military matters. In mid-October 1915, the 
Foreign Ministry in Vienna appointed its delegate with the Intelligence 
Department of the Third Army Command to represent its “administrative 
and political interests”. In early 1916, General Consul, Ladislaus Györgyey, 
replaced Von Storck and the latter was succeeded by Plenipotentiary Minis-
ter, Ludwig Graf Szechenyi, in February.39 The statute of the Military Gov-
ernorate envisaged the position of a civilian commissary and that duty was 
taken up by historian Thalloczy. It should be noted that these posts were 
filled by Hungarians alone. However, militaries systematically sabotaged 
the work of civilians, particularly that of the Foreign Ministry restraining its 
activities in Belgrade at every step. The Foreign Ministry complained to the 
Supreme Command on several occasions that its representative was blocked 
at every turn and that he had carried out his orders by constantly pleading 
with military authorities which censured his reports.40 Typical of this kind 
of relations was the dispute over the Serbian state archives that arose in 
37 Ibid. Note des ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten Grafen Tisza an den Minister des 
Äussern Grafen Berchtold, Vertraulic, Budapest 2. XII. 1914. Tisza proposed the same 
to Potiorek.
38 Ibid. Tisza an Erherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. Mai 1916.
39 Kriegsarchiv, Wien, Operationsabteilung des Armeeoberkommando, No 19867, Jän-
ner 1916; ibid. Berichte Wiesner, Teschen 3. I. 1916; ibid. Akt des Armeeoberkomman-
do (No 21540), 13. II. 1916.
40 Ibid. Operationsabteilung des AOK, No 21302, Graf Thurn ddto Teschen, 5. II. 1916; 
HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, ddto 
Wien 18. IV. 1916.  The censure of those reports did not stop before 25 May 1916. – 
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late November and early December 1915. Since the military opposed the 
transfer of the archives to Vienna as it intended to look into their content 
in Belgrade, Von Storck had cases full of archival material secretly, under the 
cover of night, transported to Zemun and thence to Austria.41
Annexationist policy of the Military Governorate in Serbia caused a 
sharp conflict. The most prominent participants were Tisza, Burián, Szech-
enyi and Thalloczy. When Governor Salis-Seewis and the War Minister 
Krobatin referred to Serbia as “an area annexed to the Monarchy”,42 Count 
Tisza seized on that opportunity with vigour to point out to the War Min-
istry the inaccuracy of such a statement and invoke the conclusions reached 
by the joint Ministerial Council.43
Educational projects of the Military Governorate provided another 
reason for intervention. In mid-January 1916, the occupation authorities 
produced a plan for opening elementary and secondary schools in Serbia. 
The exposition of this plan stressed that it was “the main task of elementary 
schools to educate children for civic life and create useful members of hu-
man society, then general education and the strengthening of character, an 
emphasis being on maintaining discipline, cleanliness and upbringing in 
terms of orderly conduct”.44 The plan encompassed a broad education pro-
gramme and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were appointed as school 
staff. The Supreme Command approved the plan on 27 January45 and the 
first of the envisaged schools was ceremoniously opened in Bitoljska Street 
in Belgrade as early as 10 February.46
School curriculum banned the use of Cyrillic alphabet. In a memo-
randum produced by the army which Count Thurn forwarded to Baron 
Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung des AOK, No 25388, Armeeoberkommando an das 
Militärgouvernment Serbien 25. V. 1916.
41 HHSTAW, P. A. K. 822, Krieg 2 (1914–18), Privatschreiben. Von Storck, Wien 4. 
XII. 1915.
42 Ibid. P. A. I, Krieg 32 b, d, e, k. u k. Militärgouvernment in Serbien an das Armee-
oberkommando, 16. I. 1916.
43 Tisza spoke against “showering good deeds [sic] on the fanatical hatred of the Serbian 
people which is guilty of this war”. – Ibid. P. A. I, Krieg 32 b, d, c, K. 974, Tisza an den 
Feldzeugmeister und Kriegsminister Alexander Freiherrn Krobatin, Budapest 13. II. 1916.
44 AS, MGG/S, box 1/48 Plt. 48, Die Grundsätze für die Errichtung der Normal und 
Mittelschulen in Serbien. Ibid. MGG/S an das AOK, Belgrad 14. I. 1916.
45 Ibid. MGG/S, box 1/48 Plt, Armeeoberkommando, Standort des AOK, 27. I. 1916.
46 HHSTAW, P. A. K. 974, Krieg 32 a-f, Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern Graf 
Szechenyi, Belgrad 10. II. 1916. – The representative of the Foreign Ministry was not 
invited to take part in this ceremony. For more detail about the opening of schools see 
AS, Plt box 2/205, 20. IV. 1916.
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Burián, Cyrillic alphabet was termed staatsgefährlich [dangerous to the 
state] because under the aegis of Serbian ecclesiastical and school auton-
omy in Vojvodina it had served as an instrument of agitation for the Serb 
cause, it provided a link between the Vojvodina Serbs with Serbia and, in 
general, contributed to preservation of national individuality of Serbs in the 
Habsburg Empire. By banning Cyrillic alphabet and advancing the edu-
cational programme the army openly demonstrated its intention to annex 
Serbia on the grounds of “general benefit for Austria-Hungary and not par-
ticular interests of one of her nations”, a clear allusion to Hungarians.47
The action of military circles met with resistance in Budapest and Vi-
enna. The civil commissary in Belgrade Thalloczy warned Governor Salis-
Seewis that this measure would draw Serbs closer to Bulgarians.48 Stürgkh, 
Burián and Tisza each made strong protest to the Supreme Command. 
These protests underscored principled importance of that matter and the 
army was warned not to prejudice the future status of Serbia by measures 
which were not in keeping with the temporary character of military occupa-
tion. Burián used the opportunity to point out the existing divergence be-
tween military and civilian authorities in Serbia.49 Tisza was even harsher: 
repeating Burián’s arguments, he disputed educational competence of sol-
diers, accused the army of eschewing deliberately Hungarian teachers and 
demanded the implementation of a “strict regime in Serbia” because “the 
Serbs must feel the consequences of their offences” in order to “break down 
the power of Serbdom and build a strong bulwark against it”.50
Exposed to such criticism, Conrad von Hötzendorf found himself 
in an unexpected position to defend the army from reproaches for its “kind 
treatment of Serbia”. In a reply to Tisza, he fully agreed with the policy 
of harsh rule in that country: “At the beginning of the offensive against 
Serbia,” Conrad von Hötzendorf wrote on 15 March 1916, “the Supreme 
Command ordered ruthless exploitation of the area. The Military Gover-
norate is now carrying out disarmament of population and securing the area 
by employing draconic measures while material resources of Serbia would 
be utilised to maximum extent regardless of population.” He explained the 
educational policy of the Governorate as resulting from aspiration to pre-
47 HHSTAW, Krieg 32 b, d, e, Graf Thurn an den Minister des Äussern Grafen Burián, 
Teschen 11. IV. 1916.
48 Ibid. Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad den 24. II. 1916.
49 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines streng vertraulichen Erlasses: 1. An den Ver-
treter des  k. u k. Ministerium des Äussern in Belgrad; 2. An den Vertreter des k. u k. 
Ministerium des Äussern bei dem k. u k. Armeeoberkommando, Wien 18. III. 1916.
50 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32e, Kon. Ung. Ministerpräsident an das k. u k. Armeeoberkom-
mando, Budapest 3. III. 1916.
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vent passive resistance and enable the full use of local economic resources. 
He regarded the use of NCOs as teaching staff in accordance with edu-
cation of “Serbian children in the spirit of discipline and order”. As for 
banning Cyrillic alphabet, it had already been prohibited in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by the imperial decree of 15 October 1915 just like it had been 
similarly removed from schools in Dalmatia.51 In a directive issued on the 
same day, Hötzendorf did not conceal annexationist intentions: Serbia had 
to be ruled with firm hand and economically exploited as much as possible, 
but it had to be taken into account that she was necessary to the Monarchy 
as an economic area in the future. Serbian intelligentsia should be dealt with 
severely whereas peasants and commercial circles should be won over. In the 
matter of schools it was necessary to limit them to elementary, and possibly 
vocational, schools, but Serbian teachers must be completely excluded “for 
they are imbued with hatred of us”.52 Such policy of the Supreme Com-
mand and Governorate in Serbia only deepened the conflict with the Hun-
garians and civilian authorities.53
Tendencies of military authorities in Serbia to transfer responsibility 
for some local administration to native people caused further suspicious-
ness. Some members of conservative Serbian circles were employed in occu-
pation administration. Claiming that such measures were devoid of politi-
cal inspiration, Governor Salis-Seewis argued that local population could 
not be completely excluded from internal administration if full economic 
exploitation of the land was to be effected. They were “carefully selected 
persons” which “did not discredit themselves politically in the past with 
outbursts against the Monarchy”.54
The municipal committee in Belgrade formed immediately after the 
conquest of the city on 10 October 1915, and reorganised into two bodies 
(Uprava and Odbor) in February 1916, was enlarged, following the resigna-
tion of Dr. Stevan Leway, with a number of well-known Serbian politi-
cians from the pre-war period. Along with the president, Vojislav Veljković, 
formerly finance minister and one of the leaders of the Popular Party, the 
committee was joined by Mihailo Popović, also a former finance minis-
ter and prominent Radical, Vasilije Antonić, formerly foreign minister and 
51 Ibid. Krieg 32 b, d, e, Conrad von Hötzendorf an Grafen Tisza, Standort des AOK, 
15. III. 1916.
52 Ibid. Conrad von Hötzendorf an das k. u k. Militärgouvernment in Belgrad, Standort 
des AOK, 15. III. 1916.
53 Ibid. Abschrift eines Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, 28. III. 1916.
54 Milikić, “Beograd pod okupacijom”, 280, 298–299. Szechenyi took a favourable view 
of the previous work of all members of the committee – HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, 
Graf Szechenyi an Minister Baron Burián, Belgrad 18. März 1916.
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well-known Independent Radical, Živojin Perić, Progressivist and universi-
ty professor, Pavle Denić, formerly construction minister, and others.55 The 
Zentralwoltätigkeits-Komitée was then formed for the purpose of collecting 
and distributing aid for population; it consisted of “prominent citizens who 
are generally trusted, politically are beyond reproach and assessed as reli-
able”. The committee started forming its subcommittees in the interior at-
tached to the county commands.56 Of course, these bodies were under strict 
control of the occupation authorities. Attached to the Belgrade Committee 
were a civilian commissary and a military advisor; the same went for the Re-
lief Committee. The members of the committee were elected on the basis of 
their personal activities rather than party affiliation.57 They were restricted 
to the bounds of their competencies. In January 1916, the former Serbian 
prime minister, Liberal Jovan Avakumović, suggested to Count Salis-See-
wis a joint proclamation to the population. The Governor was so angry with 
Avakumović because of his impertinent idea of attaching his signature next 
55 Ibid. Berichte des MGG/S, März 1916.
56 Dr. Vojislav Veljković, the chairmen of the committee, tried in May 1915 through the 
agency of the journalist Lončarević, who was assisting the representative of the Foreign 
Ministry, to initiate a general discussion between the Austro-Hungarian occupation au-
thorities and the representatives of Serbian political parties who remained in the coun-
try. He reminded of the example of the Russian Legation in Belgrade that had gathered 
together the Serbian opposition at the time of the last rulers of the Obrenović dynasty 
and proposed a similar action of the occupiers in gathering the opponents of the Kara-
djordjević dynasty and Radicals. According to Veljković and Lončarević, it was up to 
the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade to attract those parties which had not 
been ill-disposed to the Monarchy in the past. This discussion would have resulted in an 
agreement concerning the future political relations softening at the same time the un-
necessary strictness of military authorities. (HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32k Auf-
zeichnung eines Privatgespräches des Endesgefertigten, Belgrad 13. Mai 1916). Živojin 
Perić expounded similar ideas at the end of September 1916 reproaching military ad-
ministration for neglecting the supporters of the Serbian Conservative Party founded 
in 1914 with an anti-Russian and pro-Austrian political programme. Perić complained 
that the authorities were interning Austrophiles as much as Radicals. (Ibid., Krieg 32-
k-o, Note by Živojin Perić and Professor Jovanović, Belgrade, late September 1916). In 
spring 1918, Perić proposed the formation of a “constituent [assembly]” in Serbia which 
would explicitly separate the Serbian cause from the Entente Powers (ibid. Report by 
Major Safranek, Belgrade, 11 March 1918). It is interesting to note that the renowned 
Austrophile Vukašin Petrović did not play a major role under the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation, although he did offer his services to Vienna (K. 952, Krieg 25, Burián to 
Thurn, private, 17 December 1915). The Military Governorate entrusted Petrović with 
collecting harvest and cattle from the Bulgarian occupation zone (ibid., K. 977, Krieg 
32 k-o, Kuhn to Czernin, Belgrade, 23 March 1918). 
57 HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Generalkonsul Györgyey an Ministar Burián, Streng 
Vertraulich, Belgrad am 18. Jänner 1916.
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to that of Salis-Seewis himself that he ordered his arrest and internment.58 
The affair reached even the Emperor’s office which required further infor-
mation.59 A statement of Vojislav Veljković to the effect that the “Belgrade 
Committee, supported [emphasis mine] by military authorities, will do a 
useful job” also gave cause for grievance. Szechenyi complained that this 
statement suggested that the Committee had priority over military authori-
ties.60 When, at a meeting, Milivoje Spasojević, a member of the Relief 
Committee, started to criticise the occupation authorities the civilian com-
missary interrupted him and asked the Governor to have him interned.61
Recruiting local people to committees, the public celebration of 
“County Day” (Kreistag) in Gornji Milanovac, propaganda conducted by 
the Beogradske novine (Belgrade Newspaper) to the effect that the Serbian 
people would have a better future within the framework of the new state, 
public opening of schools made Hungarian ruling circles suspect that the 
army not just carried out an annexationist policy in Serbia but also pre-
pared political actions with the view to establishing some kind of domestic 
authorities under occupation. It was the fear of the Yugoslav question that 
accounted for such Hungarian attitude. The administration of Governor-
ate recruited mostly clerks of Yugoslav origin due to their language skills. 
Szechenyi went so far as to accuse Count Salis-Seewis of having special 
sympathies for the “Yugoslav race” because of his mother’s Croat origin. A 
breeze starting from the top, from the Governor, Szechenyi complained, 
was turning into a storm among clerks at the bottom causing frictions and 
awakening unjustified hopes among the Serbs contrary to ambitions of the 
occupation authorities.62 Tisza saw the Yugoslav civil servants and the Ser-
bian Belgrade Committee as an embryo of something of a Serbo-Croat 
authority that smacked of Yugoslavism and trialism.63 “All this indicates the 
formation of a permanent authority,” Tisza wrote to the Supreme Com-
mand on 3 March 1916, “in a finally conquered country, with a specific 
[political] programme.”64
58 Ibid. Copia pro actis ad Einsichtsstück der Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät vom 25. 
Jänner 1916. (betreffend den gewesenen serbischen Ministerpräsidenten Avakumović).
59 Ibid. K. 977, Krieg32a, Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad den 18. März 1918.
60 Ibid. K. 973, Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 4. IV. 1916.
61 Ibid, same as note 59.
62 Ibid. Tisza an Erherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. V. 1916.
63 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32e, Kön. ung. Ministerpräsident an das k. u k. Armeeoberkom-
mando, Budapest 3. III. 1916.
64 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Str. Vertr. Erlasses 1. an den Vertreter des k. u 
k. Ministerium des Äussern bei dem Armeeoberkommando, Wien 18. III. 1916.
D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 123
In mid-March 1916, the Foreign Ministry in Vienna and the Hun-
garian government filed their protests with the Supreme Command and 
Governorate pointing to the stepping over the bounds of powers and to 
the political consequences of such actions. Count Szechenyi was instructed 
from Vienna to personally inform Count Salis-Seewis65 but, as the rep-
resentative of the Foreign Ministry expected, the Governor took shelter 
behind the Supreme Command referring to specific orders he had received 
and which he had to carry out as a soldier.66 The Supreme Command was 
also uncompromising: Conrad von Hötzendorf defended himself that the 
writing of the occupation press could not be taken as a proof because that 
press was read abroad as well and “we have no interest in provoking foreign 
public opinion or presenting ourselves in an unfavourable light by describ-
ing our draconic repressive measures in Serbia”.67
In order to find out what the real state of affairs was, Tisza himself un-
dertook an inspection tour in north-west Serbia in early May 1916 includ-
ing a visit to the General Governor in Belgrade. On that occasion he visited 
Šabac, Koviljača, Zabrežje, Valjevo and Lazarevac.68 Upon his return, Tisza 
decided to finally settle the question. First in a written communication,69 
then in a conversation with Erzherzog Friedrich and Conrad von Höt-
zendorf at the end of May in Teschen, the seat of the Supreme Command, 
he requested a thorough reorganisation of the Military Governorate, the 
removal of Governor and condemnation of annexationist policy in Serbia. 
Since Hötzendorf again refused to accept Tisza’s reasons defending the 
army, the Hungarian Prime Minister addressed Baron Burián on 3 June 
with the plea to have the Emperor’s verdict in this dispute invoking the 
decisions of the joint Ministerial Council of 19 July 1914 and 7 January 
1916. “The Hungarian government will not assume responsibility for events 
on the southern frontier and their impact on the hinterland,” Tisza con-
cluded, “if the Military Governorate continues with its activities that run 
contrary to vital interests of the Hungarian state.”70 That was an ultimatum 
on the part of Hungary and Burián understood it as such. In his note to the 
65 Ibid. Graf Szechenyi an den Herrn Minister des k. u k. Hauses und des Äussern 
Baron Burián, Belgrad 24. III. 1916. – Governor Salis-Seewis complained that Burián 
was ill-informed openly alluding to his interlocutor Szechenyi as a source of inaccurate 
information. 
66 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32 b, d, e, Conrad von Hötzendorf an Grafen Tisza, Standort des 
AOK, 15. III. 1916.
67 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 17. Mai 1916.
68 Ibid. Graf Tisza an Erzherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. V. 1916.
69 Ibid. Graf Tisza an Baron Burián, Budapest 3. Juni 1916.
70 Ibid. Abschrift eines alleruntertänigsten Immediatvortrages ddto Wien, 9. Juni 1916.
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Emperor on 9 June he reminded of the decisions of the joint Ministerial 
Council in respect of Serbia, repeated all the accusations against the policy 
of Military Governorate and used the opportunity to demand extension of 
authority given to the representative of civilian authorities.71 Both propos-
als were accepted: by the Emperor’s decision of 6 July 1916 Count Salis-
Seewis and his chief of staff, Colonel Gelinek, were recalled and replaced by 
General Adolf von Rhemen and Colonel Hugo Kerchnawe.72 The removal 
of Salis-Seewis was received in Belgrade, in the words of Szechenyi, as a 
“thunder from a clear sky”. The Governor was angry and he instantly left 
Belgrade in a car. A protest addressed to the Supreme Command failed. 
Ironically referring to certain parts of Salis-Seewis’s farewell order men-
tioning a “peaceful and content population”, Szechenyi pointed out that a 
plot had just been discovered in Serbia involving 50 persons of which 12 
had been hanged.73
The Emperor’s decision of 6 July authorised Baron Burián to submit 
the necessary proposals to the Supreme Command for the purpose of ex-
tending authority of a civilian commissary. He did it promptly on 10 July 
disputing the qualifications, previous knowledge and practical experience of 
military men in the matters of a political-administrative nature. The Statute 
of the General Military Governorate in Serbia considerably extended the 
power of civilian authorities. Civilian commissary was, just like Governor, 
appointed by the Emperor; he was charged with all matters of civilian ad-
ministration, appointing, replacing and rewarding clerks; the entire politi-
cal, economic, financial, and legal service of the Governorate, completely 
separated from military functions, was under him. Civilian officials headed 
all non-military departments.74 The entry of Romania into war in August 
1916 temporarily postponed coming into force of these changes – that fi-
nally took place on 15 October 1916.75
The conflict of military and civilian authorities in occupied Serbia 
ended in the defeat of the Supreme Command’s conceptions in summer 
1916. In keeping with the interests of Hungarian ruling circles her fate 
71 Ibid. Emperor’s decision of 8 July 1916. 
72 Ibid. Streng vertrauliches Privatschreiben des Grafen Szechenyi ddto Belgrad, 12. 
Juli 1916.
73 Ibid. Abschrift eines geheimen Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, Armeeoberkommando, 
ddto Wien. 10. VII. 1916 – The suggested changes were attached. 
74 Ibid. Telegramm an Grafen Thurn 20. IX. 1916; F. Kinsky an Baron Burián, Teschen 
10. X. 1916.
75 Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 28818/I, Armeeoberkommando an das 
Militergeneralgouvernment in Serbien 29. VIII. 1916; ibid. No 30219, 15. IX. 1916; 
ibid. No 30473, 13. IX. 1916 and No 30185, 9. IX. 1916.
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remained uncertain in anticipation of the outcome of the war that was still 
in full swing. In the meantime, Serbia was going to be ruled with the iron 
fist of military occupation. 
V
The occupation authorities in Serbia in 1915–1918 had three basic tasks: to 
secure peace and order, to conduct economic exploitation of the country and 
to create the necessary conditions for the life of population.
1) The shifting of the war theatre towards the south (the Salonica 
front), military operations on the Italian front, the increasing demands from 
the main theatres of war in the west and east of Europe constantly di-
minished military effectives stationed in Serbia. In mid-October 1915, the 
Command of the Belgrade Bridgehead (Brückenkopfkommando) was formed 
for the purpose of fortifying a defence line towards the south. The Com-
mand of the City of Belgrade was added to it later, but technical works of 
the Belgrade Bridgehead Command were ceased as early as spring 1916, a 
large number of men was withdrawn and the command itself was dissolved 
in August 1917. Romania’s entry into war against the Central Powers in 
August 1916 brought the Serbian land to the vicinity of battlefield for a 
brief time. A strategic reserve was then formed in the Kragujevac-Palanka-
Arandjlovac area which was also prepared to suppress hostile movements of 
the population. Mines were laid in the river. However, a rapid success on the 
Romanian front pushed again the Serbian land deeper into the background 
of military operations. The occupation forces adhered to the ratio of keep-
ing 30,000 soldiers to control 50,000 civilians of military age.76 However, 
this ratio could not be maintained: in summer 1917, the General Military 
Governorate had just 16,000 troops at its disposal many of whom were 
not of particular fighting capabilities.77 Their duty was mostly reduced to 
securing the railway, harvest, occasional searching for guerrilla groups, par-
ticularly guarding against the crossing of such groups from the Bulgarian 
occupation zone during and after the well-known Toplica insurgency in 
spring 1917.78 The stationed troops were increasingly ill-fed and ill-kept in 
76 HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32a, Materieller Monatsbericht des MGG/S pro 
Monat August 1917.
77 Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 51692, Chef des Ersatzwesens für die 
gesamte bewafnete Macht, Wien 1. Juni 1917; HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32k, 
Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis 15. Juli 1917.
78 According to a table of food rationing, Austro-Hungarian soldiers daily received 280g 
of bread as opposed to 750g allotted to German soldiers. – HHSTAW, P. A. I, Krieg 
32k, Monatsbericht MGG/S pro Jänner 1918.
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comparison to German units.79 Prolongation of war, military defeats, news 
of the revolution in Russia diminished the morale of the occupation troops, 
especially common soldiers and NCOs. At the beginning of June 1918 the 
Ersatzbataillon of the 71st infantry regiment in Kragujevac with 700 sol-
diers revolted. They were quelled with the use of artillery.80
In order to keep subdued 1,375,000 people estimated to populate 
the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone in Serbia with the relatively small 
and weak contingent of occupation troops, severe preventive measures were 
undertaken against civilians: deportation (internment), disarmament and 
hostage-taking.
Deportations were carried out on several occasions: in late 1915, during 
the advancing of the Central Powers’ armies in Serbia, then upon Romania’s 
entry into war in 1916 and finally, during the Toplica uprising in spring 1917, 
and in late 1918.81 The largest-scale deportations were those undertaken from 
mid-August to the end of October 1916 in connection with Romania’s dec-
laration of war. On 31 August, the Governorate issued the following order 
to the county commands: “Die Ruhe und Sicherheit sind, wenn nötig, mit 
den schärfsten Massnahmen (Geiseln, Dezimieren, Niederbrennung etc.) 
unbedingt aufrechtzuerhalten” [Peace and security must be maintained if nec-
essary with the most severe measures (deportations, annihilations, burning 
down, etc.)].82 On that occasion 16,500 people were interned in Serbia and 
then deported to camps in Hungary and Austria (Vacz, Czegled, Nezsider, 
Naymeguer, Arad, Aschach, Heinrichsbrün, Braunau). This action was sys-
tematically executed: the remnants of the Serbian army (soldiers, NCOs, of-
ficers) that had remained in the country and avoided being taken to prisoner 
camps were first interned; then intelligentsia was arrested, especially those 
which had been hostile to the Monarchy before the war or participated in 
the work of political, national, cultural and even sport societies;83 then other 
79 Ibid. K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Berichte Kuhn, Belgrad 5. VI. 1918. – According to Kuhn, 
4 soldiers were killed and 12 wounded on that occasion. 
80 J. A. Pisarev, “Okkupatsiia Serbii Avstro-Vengrii i bor’ba serbskogo naroda za svoe 
osvobozhdenie v 1916–1918 gg”, Sovetskoe slavianovedenie 4 (1965), 33.
81 Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK No 30185, MGG/S an das Kreiskommando, 
Belgrad 31. VIII. 1916.
82 The Serbian societies were listed: the Black Hand [sic], National Defence, Yugoslav 
Club, League of Volunteers, Marksmen Society, Dušan the Mighty, Obilić, Kolo jahača, 
Pobratimstvo Football Club [sic], Kolo srpske braće, members of masonic lodges, male 
members of Kolo srpskih sestara, members of the editorial boards of all Serbian journals 
including the humoristic ones (Brka, Spadalo, Djavo).    
83 HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Telegramm in Ziffern an Baron Kuhn, Wien 
15. IV. 1917.
D. Djordjević, The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia 127
people between 17 and 50 years of age who were capable of military service. 
The remaining peasants were organised in Internierten-Arbeiterabteilungen to 
work in the fields. Elderly persons with material resources were allowed to be 
confined in Austria-Hungary rather than interned.84 In May 1917, around 
40,000 Serb civilians were in the camps of Austria-Hungary.85 These mass de-
portations caused alarm beyond Serbia’s borders: even the Vatican intervened 
in April 1917 through the papal nuncio in Vienna against the internment of 
children.86 Imprisonment in camps cut both ways and it considerably ham-
pered agricultural production. That is why some of the interned peasants were 
sent back in 1917.87
Disarmament of population was undertaken for the purpose of paci-
fication. It took place on several occasions under threat of death penalty for 
hiding arms.88 There were a lot of weapons remaining among the people: in 
March 1917, thirty persons were executed and 288 indicted for hiding arms 
in the Kragujevac County alone.89 Upon the proclamation of amnesty, on 
28 June 1917, 1230 rifles, 474 pistols, 54 hand grenades and other military 
material were turned in.90 That large quantities of arms remained hidden 
despite all this would become obvious at the end of the war.
Taking of hostages was a similar security measure and it was increas-
ingly applied as the war was drawing to an end and the resistance of the 
population was turning into armed struggle. Hostages were taken to secure 
harvest, threshers and railway or in the case of anonymous threats to senior 
officials of the occupation apparatus.91 The intelligence department, state 
police and gendarmerie, as well as financial organs within the General Gov-
ernorate did their best to establish a wide intelligence network for gauging 
public opinion, espionage and counterespionage. The instructions prepared 
84 Pisarev, “Okkupatsiia Serbii ”, 33.
85 HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Telegramm in Ziffern an Baron Kuhn, Wien 
15. IV. 1917.
86 Ibid. K. 977, Krieg 32k, Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 15. bis 31. Mai 1917. Af-
ter this protest some 10,000 people were returned to Serbia to join working battalions. 
87 Ibid. Verordnung des AOK und des MGG/S betreffend den Besitz von Waffen, Mu-
nitionsgegenständen und Sprengstoffen im hiesigen Okkupationsgebeite, Belgrad 21. 
Oktober 1916.
88 Ibid. Situationsbericht pro Monat März 1917.
89 Ibid. Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis 15. Juli 1917, Belgrad 16. VII. 1917.
90 E.g., an anonymous threat of an Austro-Hungarian intelligence officer was sent to 
the General-Governor in June 1917: ibid. Gesandte Kuhn an Grafen Burián, Str. Vertr. 
Belgrad 24. VI. 1917.
91 AS, MGG/S, Intelligence Department, box 1/3/42/45, Circular from the Intelligence 
Department and practical instructions.
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by the intelligence service in Serbia emphasised the need for creating a 
network of trusted persons among the people for the purpose of gather-
ing information on the general mood, deportations, intelligentsia’s activities 
– especially that which was anti-Habsburg – anti-occupation movements, 
spreading of alarming news and texts, smuggling, arms hiding, abuse by 
officials etc.92 Monthly reports preserved in the archives of the Intelligence 
Department of Military Governorate reflect the vigilance with which the 
occupation authorities kept tabs on what was going on in Serbia. Denuncia-
tions demonstrate a specific psychological pressure exerted on population 
by means of accusations that were largely based on statements given in a 
state of agitation and anger.
2) Economic exploitation of Serbia was based on confiscations, req-
uisitions, use of economic resources and labour. In June 1916, the property 
belonging to all persons considered associated with the Sarajevo assassina-
tion was confiscated.93 In the wake of the entry of occupation troops in 
Serbia in 1915, large-scale requisitions of wool, copper, brass, nickel, zinc 
and its alloys, foodstuff and leather ensued. Special units for conducting 
searches, the so-called Suchdetaschement, were formed; each consisted of an 
NCO, corporal, scribe, locksmith (for breaking in) and four or five soldiers. 
The requisitioned material was sent to Materialsammelstelle in Belgrade and 
then transported to Austria-Hungary.94
At the end of 1915, a central administrative body was formed in Vi-
enna for exporting raw materials from Serbia, Montenegro, Serbian Mace-
donia, Albania and Poland. In summer 1916, the K. u k. Wahren-Verkehrs 
Zentrale was established in Belgrade as an agency of Governorate with the 
view to “mediating and furthering trading traffic between the occupation 
area in Serbia and Montenegro, on the one side, and Austria-Hungary, on 
the other”.95 Under this new scheme, all companies abandoned by Serbian 
owners when retreating from the country became receivership. An artificial 
exchange rate of Serbian dinar to ruble was imposed and Serbian paper 
money was stamped over. It is interesting to note that this currency re-
form dismally failed: out of 150 million dinars estimated to circulate in 
the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone only 38 million were stamped over 
92 HHSTAW, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 9. VII. 1916.
93 Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32g, An das k. u k. Armee-Etappenkommando – Expositur Bel-
grad, Feldpost 211, 10. XII. 1915; ibid. Bestimmungen für die Suchdetachements; ibid. 
Organische Bestimmungen und Dienstvorsichiften für die Materialsammelstelle.
94 Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 28418, Provisorische Bestimungen für k. 
u k. Waren-Verkehrs Zentrale in Belgrad, Standort des AOK, 2. VIII. 1916.
95 HHSTAW, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Vertrauliche Privatschreiben des Grafen Szechenyi 
ddto Belgrad an Baron Mussulin, 16. VIII. 1916.
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and the old dinar retained in Serbia greater value that the Austrian krone 
(100:102).96 The occupiers opened branches of their banks, particularly 
from Budapest (Andrejević & Co). Fortnightly and monthly reports from 
Military Governorate preserved in Serbian and Austrian archives are rife 
with information on economic exploitation of the country, export of agri-
cultural raw materials, use of forests and mines and penetration of Austro-
Hungarian companies in Serbia. The wealth and diversity of this source 
material requires a special study on the economic policy of the occupation 
power in Serbia in 1915–1918.
3) All Austro-Hungarian reports on the conquest of Serbia in 1915 
noted a desperate state of population and famine threatening the occupa-
tion zone. The return of refugees exacerbated shortage of food: the popula-
tion of Belgrade rose from 15,000 in January 1916 to 50,000 in July 1917. 
Such situation created a twofold danger for the occupation power: local 
resources could not satisfy the needs of the occupation troops; destitution 
and desperation were not conducive to a peaceful rear.97 Foreign propagan-
da caused much damage with its claims that Serbian population was dying 
of hunger.98 Reports from Serbia in late 1915 spoke of the necessity of re-
ceiving urgent relief from Austria-Hungary to avoid disaster. The Austrian 
Prime Minister, Baron Stürgkh, was willing to respond to such appeals, but 
Conrad von Hötzendorf and Tisza were opposed. The Supreme Command 
suggested organising an international aid, but such action would take too 
long.99 Indeed, it did not start to function, in limited conditions, before 
spring 1916; The International Red Cross, Swiss and Swedish humanitar-
ian organisations embarked on transferring Romanian wheat to Serbia.100 
Meanwhile, the Governorate had to make do with the rational use of the 
existing supplies; some 1,000 wagonloads of crops were imported for the 
spring sowing in 1916 and then 600 wagonloads of flour and grains. Pen-
sions of clerks were recognised in early February 1916.101 Foodstuff was 
96 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32 a-f, K. u k. Armeeoberkommando an das Ministerium des Äus-
sern, Standort des AOK, 7. XII. 1915; ibid. Krieg 32 b, d, e, Militärgeneralgouvernment 
in Serbien Präs 576, an das Armeeoberkommando, 16. Jänner 1916.
97 Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32a-f, Baron Wiesner an Baron Burián 4. I. 1916.
98 Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern beim k. u k. Armeeober-
kommando, Teschen 20. XI. 1915; ibid. Conrad von Hötzendorf an das Ministerium 
des Äussern, Standort des AOK am 18. XI. 1915; ibid. Krieg 32b, Der Vertreter des 
Ministeriums des Äussern beim AOK, Teschen 6. I. 1916.
99 Ibid. Krieg 32 a-f, Berichte des schweizerischen Gesandten in Wien, 11. II. 1916, 8. 
II. 1916.
100 Ibid. Krieg 32b, Draft for feeding civilian population in the occupied parts of Serbia. 
101 AS, MGG/S, Military Department, box 1, Belgrade, 28 January 1918, Table of food. 
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rationed and increasingly reduced: in January 1918, children from five to 
thirteen years received 320 g of meat and 120 g of lard a week; adults were 
entitled to a weekly ration of 480 g of meat and 240 g of lard. In July 1918, 
the amount of meat was cut down to 200 g and 300 g respectively.102 
In order to fully control the youth and re-educate it in “the spirit 
of discipline and order”, the Governorate continued with its educational 
policy. During the last school year under occupation (1917/18) eight gram-
mar schools with 4,000 in- and 3,000 out-school pupils, and 135 elemen-
tary schools (1916–17) with 24,000 pupils were operating in Serbia. Some 
105,000 children could not attend school due to the lack of space.103 Be-
cause of the ban on the use of Cyrillic alphabet there was not enough text-
books – even Serbian textbooks from Vojvodina which were printed in Cy-
rillic and approved in the Habsburg Monarchy were not allowed in Serbia. 
The University of Belgrade was closed down throughout the occupation.104 
The religion question also caused difficulties for the occupation regime as 
the highest-ranking clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church had left the 
country with the Serbian army. The bishops of Niš and Šabac were interned 
in Bulgaria and some 200 priests were incarcerated in camps in Austria-
Hungary. Illegitimate marriages were growing in number. Court Spiritual 
did not function and the Church as an organised institution did not ex-
ist. The canon law of the Serbian Church did not allow bringing bishops 
from Austria-Hungary to elect the new metropolitan.105 In October 1918, 
the Bulgarians were requested to release the imprisoned bishops and return 
them in their dioceses, but this was a belated measure as the occupation was 
fast approaching its end.106
VI
Despite physical and psychological pressure exerted on the population dur-
ing the occupation in 1915–1918, the spirit of the Serbian people was not 
broken. Numerous reports of military and civilian occupation authorities 
are a testament to that. In one of those reports written in March 1917 it is 
102 Out of 125 elementary schools, 95 were Serbian, the rest were Albanian and Muslim 
– HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32k, Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis  15. Juli 
1917; Ibid. Situationsbericht pro Monat März 1917; Ibid. Der Vertreter des Ministeri-
ums des Äussern, Belgrad 13. III. 1918 and 13. II. 1918.
103 Ibid. Krieg 32e, Militärgeneralgouvernment in Serbien, Einfürung der cyrillischen 
Schulbücher in die Mittelschulen des MGG/S Bereiches, Belgrad 24. VIII. 1918.
104 Sto godina Filozofskog fakulteta (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1963), 88–89. 
105 HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, MGG/S an das AOK, Ibid. Kuhn an Burián, 
Belgrad 28. VII. 1918.
106 Ibid. Weisung an Otto Czernin in Sofia, Wien 1. X. 1918.
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said: “Im grössten Teile der Bevölkerung lebt noch immer die fantastische 
Hoffnung auf ein selbständiges Serbien” [Most of the population still main-
tains the fantastic hope of an independent Serbia].107 News from the fronts 
and development of military operations received special attention; there was 
talk of the impending end of the war. “The Serbs hope for a better future 
and all that is displeasing to us is pleasing to them”, an intelligence report 
read.108
Although there was armed resistance in the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation zone, it did not reflect the true intensity of popular feeling. 
Much of the male population had left the country when the Serbian army 
had broken through Albania to the sea; part of the army ended as POWs; 
large-scale deportations and interments, particularly in 1916, thwarted, to 
a large extent, the growth of the resistance movement. According to the 
Austro-Hungarians, these deportations were the main reason that pre-
vented the spread of the Toplica uprising (Toplički ustanak) from the Bul-
garian occupation zone to Šumadija. From fall 1916 onwards, reports of 
the occupation authorities more frequently mentioned “bands” operating 
in Serbia.109 Three attempts at organising wider resistance in the country 
were discovered in 1916; in spring and fall 1917, similar attempts were 
suppressed in Brus, then in the vicinity of Kragujevac and Kruševac.110 
The Toplica uprising encompassed the area around the Zapadna (West) 
Morava river spreading across Mali Jastrebac and Mt Kopaonik.111 In the 
part of Serbia under Austro-Hungarian occupation, however, there were 
no mass movements like those in the Bulgarian zone. Units operating 
in this area and relying on a wide network of local people consisted of 
four to twenty men; they avoided fighting against occupation forces and 
were concerned with eliminating traitors (mostly the heads of rural mu-
nicipalities). Regular fortnightly and monthly reports of the occupation 
authorities abounded with details about the activities of such groups. They 
emerged all across Serbia but operated locally.112 Sabotages, particularly 
107 Ibid. Krieg 32k, Situationsberichte pro Monat März 1917.
108 Ibid. Major Safranek an das AOK, Belgrad 28. I. 1918; see also: Kriegsarchiv, Ope-
rationsabteilung AOK No 37388, Nachrichtenabteilung des MGG/S, Belgrad 15. XII. 
1916; HHSTAW, P. A. I. K. 977, Kreig 32 k-o, Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 25. IV. 1917; 
ibid. Nachrichtenabteilung des AOK und Evidenzbureau des Generalstabes, Belgrad 1. 
VI. 1917; ibid. Monatsbericht vom 1. bis 31. März 1918, Belgrad 1. IV. 1918.
109 Ibid. Der Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern, Belgrad 17. I. 1917.
110 Ibid. K. 975, Krieg 32g, General von Rhemen an den Vertreter des Ministeriums des 
Äussern, Belgrad 10. VI. 1917.
111 M. Perović, Toplički ustanak (Belgrade, 1959), 148. 
112 HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 9. XI. 1917.
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burning of harvest, also took place. The authorities did not have enough 
troops to undertake wider and stronger measures against the bands and 
thus reacted with repression against civilian population in an attempt to 
isolate the bands from the masses. Any person caught in an act of sabo-
tage was shot on the spot. Municipalities to which a perpetrator belonged 
were also punished: grain and cattle was confiscated, pecuniary penal-
ties were imposed, men between 16 and 60 years of age were occasion-
ally interned, houses were set on fire etc.113 The Russian Revolution, the 
revolt of Austro-Hungarian troops in Kragujevac in June 1918 and the 
increasing devastation of land as the war drew closer to an end facilitated 
armed resistance. In July 1918, 32 attacks were recorded in the Kragu-
jevac County alone; 105 took place in August 1918 in Serbia.114 Along 
with local population, deserters from military units and fugitives from 
camps also committed such attacks. The authorities suspected the exis-
tence of an organised network which operated in coordination with the 
operations of the Serbian army on the Salonica front.115 From September 
to mid-October the occupation forces tried to cleanse the ground from 
guerrilla groups. Not much was accomplished: 100 deserters and only one 
komita were captured. It was reported on 22 October that unrest among 
the people reached such proportions as to make access to the frontline ex-
tremely difficult.116 B. Hrabak’s study amply documented the participation 
of Serbian population in driving the occupation forces out of the country 
in October 1918.117
Under the pressure from outside and inside the occupation system 
in Serbia was in full demise in October 1918. An attempt to take out food 
and material resources from the country and transport them to Austria-
Hungary was the last spasm of the occupation regime. After the capitula-
tion of Bulgaria on 29 September, the Serbian army and Allied forces were 
liberating the country with great rapidity. The last report of Baron Kuhn, 
the representative of the Foreign Ministry, was sent from Belgrade on 27 
October. The next day he left Belgrade, along with General-Governor von 
Rhemen and his staff, and went to Subotica.118 Three days later, on 1 No-
113 Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 31. VII. 1918, declaration is attached.
114 Ibid. MGG/S – Monatsbericht für Monat Juni 1918; Ibid. General-Oberst Rhemen 
an den Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern in Belgrad, 2. VIII. 1918 and 23. IX. 1918.
115 Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 7. VIII. 1918. and 25. IX. 1918. Kuhn considered 
these movements “a general uprising”. 
116 Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin 22. X. 1918.
117 B. Hrabak, “Učešće stanovništva Srbije u proterivanju okupatora oktobra 1918”, Isto-
rijski glasnik 3–4 (1958), 25–50. 
118 HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Baron Kuhn – Berichte, Belgrad 27. X. 1918.
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vember, Belgrade was liberated. This brought to an end the tragic history of 
Serbia under the Austro-Hungarian occupation regime from 1915 to 1918.
UDC 94(497.11:436/439)”1914/1918”
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